卖掉工厂?合同制造对创新、产能和盈利能力的影响

Sell the Plant? The Impact of Contract Manufacturing on Innovation, Capacity, and Profitability

Management Science · 2005
被引 258
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究电子等行业中原始设备制造商将生产设施卖给合同制造商后,合同制造通过产能共享提高利用率,但可能削弱创新激励,从而影响行业整体盈利能力。

Abstract

In the electronics industry and others, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are selling their production facilities to contract manufacturers (CMs). The CMs achieve high capacity utilization through pooling (supplying many different OEMs). Meanwhile, the OEMs focus on innovation: research and development, product design, and marketing. We examine how this change in industry structure affects investment in innovation and capacity, and thus profitability. In particular, innovation is noncontractible, so OEMs will invest less in innovation than is ideal for the industry as a whole. Hence, although contract manufacturing improves capacity utilization, it may reduce the profitability of the industry as a whole by weakening the incentives for innovation. Contract manufacturing is not the only means to achieve capacity pooling. Alternatively, the OEMs can pool capacity with one another through supply contracts or a joint venture. This may result in underinvestment or overinvestment in innovation and capacity, but always increases profitability. We find that the sale of production facilities to a CM improves profitability for the industry as a whole if and only if OEMs are subsequently in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the CM. If the OEMs are indeed very strong, the gain from pooling capacity via contract manufacturing is maximized in industries with moderate cost of capacity.

合同制造产能共享创新激励议价能力行业盈利