How Strong Are Weak Patents?
研究概率性专利（未完全确定有效性的专利）的福利经济学，分析在许可前确定专利有效性对社会福利的影响，包括事后无谓损失和事前创新激励，并利用博弈模型证明许可前审查对社会有益。
We study the welfare economics of probabilistic patents that are licensed without a full determination of validity. We examine the social value of instead determining patent validity before licensing to downstream technology users, in terms of deadweight loss (ex post) and innovation incentives (ex ante). We relate the value of such pre-licensing review to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would hold up in court, and to the per-unit royalty at which it would be licensed. We then apply these results using a game-theoretic model of licensing to downstream oligopolists, in which we show that determining patent validity prior to licensing is socially beneficial.