On the Coalition-Proofness of the Pareto Frontier of the Set of Nash Equilibria
证明，在满足特定条件（如三人博弈或收益仅依赖自身策略与他人策略之和）的策略替代博弈中，纳什均衡集的帕累托有效前沿具有联盟抗性，即帕累托占优精炼等价于联盟抗性纳什均衡精炼。
This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each player's payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy. Under these conditions, the Pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.