Oligopsony Power, Asset Specificity, and Hold‐Up: Evidence from the Broiler Industry
利用肉鸡养殖户全国调查数据，检验生产合同中的敲竹杠问题，发现养殖户投资不足与一体化企业的市场势力和资产专用性有关，合同收益也受升级要求频率和企业市场势力影响。
In this article we look for empirical evidence of hold‐up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross‐sectional national survey of broiler growers. First, we focus on the problem of under‐investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent's (grower's) under‐investment systematically depends on the principal's (integrator's) market power and the level of asset specificity. Second, we provide an indirect test of hold‐up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal's market power. The results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold‐up.