Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
构建了单一物品二价拍卖和英式拍卖中投标人合谋行为的模型，发现合谋策略是占优策略，且拍卖人的最优反应是设定与合谋规模相关的保留价。
Models of collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions are provided. The ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer. Cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models; coalitions of any size are viable, and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition. In addition, the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium. The optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition's size. These and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.