Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions
利用水权拍卖数据，通过序贯英式拍卖模型估计互补品或替代品下的需求，发现互补品时单一买家高价赢得所有单位，替代品时不同买家以相近价格赢得单位，且需求估计若忽略此特征会产生偏误。
Abstract We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with noncooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features.