Evaluation of Price Policy in the Presence of Water Theft
通过校准印度马哈拉施特拉邦一个包含30个农场的代表性水渠模型，发现上游农民偷水行为不仅增加了价格政策的社会成本，还导致下游农民水资源减少和收入降低。
Abstract Mathematical programming models of “representative” farms are commonly used to evaluate policies such as input subsidies and output price supports. On canals in India, upstream farmers routinely use more irrigation water than allotted. In such circumstances, the programming model should encompass farmers' locational heterogeneity. Here, a representative watercourse with thirty farms is calibrated to the eight crops, fifteen irrigation turns, yield responses to water, and seepage in Maharashtra. Not only does water “theft” increase the social cost of price policies, but the policies' increased inducement to theft by upstream farmers leaves those downstream with less water and lower incomes.