Is Unemployment Lower if Unions Bargain Over Employment?
分析工会同时谈判工资和就业时对就业的影响，发现若生产函数为柯布-道格拉斯形式，就业与仅谈判工资时相同；从完全竞争劳动力市场转向高效谈判时，就业反而下降。
We consider an economy in which all firms are unionized and bargain with their own union. (1) If unions bargain over employment as well as wages, employment will be the same as if they bargain over wages only, provided that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. (Employment will be higher if the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is smaller than unity.) (2) If we start from a fully competitive labor market and then move to one of efficient bargaining (over wages and employment), employment falls. This is so even if the marginal utility of income is constant, so that bargaining is "strongly efficient."