MARKET DISTORTIONS AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY
研究了经济扭曲如何影响政府透明度，发现当扭曲足够高时，即使透明在事前帕累托优于不透明，也无法形成均衡，并在垄断和所得税情境下验证了这一结论。
In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.