Bargaining and Value
提出并分析了一个n人非合作讨价还价模型，适用于联盟形式的博弈，统一了可转移效用下的Shapley值、纯讨价还价下的Nash解以及一般不可转移效用下的Maschler-Owen一致值等解概念。
We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form. This leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the Shapley value in the transferable utility (TU) case, the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case, and the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility (NTU) case. Moreover, we show that any variation (in a certain class) of our bargaining procedure which generates the Shapley value in the TU setup must yield the consistent value in the general NTU setup.