Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests
证明在私有价值拍卖中，部分持股的竞标者会策略性过度出价，这可能导致效率损失和赢家净亏损，并解释了大股东如何影响收购溢价和成功率。
ABSTRACT Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private‐value auctions the optimal individually rational strategy for a bidder with partial ownership of the item is to overbid, i.e., to bid more than his valuation. This strategy, however, can lead to i ) an inefficient outcome, and ii ) the winning bidder making a net loss. Further, the overbidding result implies that the presence of a large shareholder increases the bid premium in single‐bidder takeovers at the expense of reducing the probability of the takeover actually occurring.