Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics
研究了美国水泥行业在温室气体排放限制政策下的静态与动态影响，发现排放管制会加剧市场力量扭曲和碳泄漏，导致社会福利损失，但通过特定设计可带来福利改善。
We assess the static and dynamic implications of alternative market-based policies limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the US cement industry. Our results highlight two countervailing market distortions. First, emissions regulation exacerbates distortions associated with the exercise of market power in the domestic cement market. Second, emissions "leakage" in trade-exposed markets offsets domestic emissions reductions. Taken together, these forces can result in social welfare losses under policy regimes that fully internalize the emissions externality. Market-based policies that incorporate design features to mitigate the exercise of market power and emissions leakage deliver welfare gains when damages from carbon emissions are high.