Do Overvaluation-Driven Stock Acquisitions Really Benefit Acquirer Shareholders?
利用内部人交易衡量股票高估程度，研究发现高估值促使管理者进行股票收购，但这些收购在短期和长期都损害了收购方股东的价值。
Abstract I study the effects of overvalued equity on acquisition activity and shareholder wealth, using managers’ insider trades to measure overvaluation. I find that overvalued equity drives managers to make stock acquisitions, and such acquisitions destroy value for acquirer shareholders. Overvalued stock acquirers earn negative and lower returns in the short run and substantially underperform similarly overvalued nonacquirer firms in the long run. My results do not support the idea that managers can benefit shareholders by converting overvalued equity into real assets through stock acquisitions.