The Effect of Property Rights and Audit Information Quality on Team Incentives for Inventory Reduction
用两期代理模型分析有限合同性和审计信息质量如何影响库存水平及个体生产与团队生产的最优选择，发现审计信息充分时团队生产最优，信息不充分时团队会内生降低库存甚至零库存。
We analyze how limited contractibility and the informational quality of audits affect inventory levels and the optimality of individual versus team-based production. We use a two-period agency model in which contractibility is limited and agents meet a fixed delivery quota each period. A costly audit is triggered in any period if the delivery quota of output for the period is not met. We show that the informativeness of the audit plays a crucial role in resolving coordination problems between agents when they are organized as a team. When the audit is perfectly informative about agent productivity and inventory levels, team-based production is optimal. The team meets its quota even though, in equilibrium, the audit never takes place. If the audit is not perfectly informative about inventory levels, we show that team-based production typically induces agents to endogenously reduce inventory levels and could even result in agents adopting a zero-inventory policy. When the audit is completely uninformative, individual production is superior to team-based production.