Understanding Overbidding in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study
通过第二价格私人价值拍卖实验，研究竞拍者收到对手价值噪音信号后如何影响出价过高行为，发现中小额过高出价支持“求胜喜悦”假说，大额过高出价符合“恶意”假说。
We present results from second price private value auction (SPA) experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponents' value. Such signals change bidders' perception about the 'strength' of their opponent, and the relationship between bidders' perception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in SPA. We found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values, supporting a modified 'joy of winning' hypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values, consistent with the 'spite' hypothesis. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.