Unemployment and the ‘Labour‐management Conspiracy’
研究管理层与工会就雇佣规则和工资进行谈判，政府补贴可能增加失业并恶化劳动力配置，因为内生工资变化导致“劳资共谋”现象。
We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a 'labour-management conspiracy'.