Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling
研究企业竞争中使用非线性定价（如两部收费）的均衡，发现当需求弹性、消费者异质性、购物成本及品牌偏好相关性存在时，非线性定价可能提高利润但损害消费者福利。
We examine competitive non-linear pricing in a model in which consumers have heterogeneous and elastic demands and can buy from more than one supplier. It is an equilibrium for firms to offer a menu of efficient two-part tariffs, where the discount for one-stop shopping is such that the elasticity of “demand for two-stop shopping” equals two. Compared with linear pricing, non-linear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumers when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is heterogeneity in consumer demand, (iii) consumers incur shopping costs when buying from more than one firm, and (iv) a consumer's brand preference for one product is correlated with her brand preference for another product. Non-linear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when (iii) and (iv) hold, but (ii) does not.