信号传递、工资控制与货币反通胀政策

Signalling, Wage Controls and Monetary Disinflation Policy

Economic Journal · 1989
被引 2
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

探讨工资与价格控制在反通胀计划中的作用,分析其宏观经济收益与微观经济成本,并讨论财政与货币政策在其中的支持角色。

Abstract

Wage and price controls have a long and somewhat disreputable history, presumably because of their frequent use in many countries as short run substitutes for measure~ with more lasting effects on the inflation rate. But, in 1985 and 1986, Argentina, Brazil, and Israel used extensive wage-price controls as part of more comprehensive disinflation programs, .often labeled "heterodox" stabilization programs. To date, the Israeli stabilization seems to have succeeded, while the Argentinean and Brazilian stabi1izations have clearly ended in failure. This experience raises many questions. One view is that controlling one nominal variable, namely the money supply, is enough to bring down inflation provided that sound fiscal policies are also adopted. Therefore, wage and price controls should be avoided, because of their microeconomic costs. It is clear that controls do have microeconomic costs, but can they also have macroeconomic benefits? Under which circumstances do controls help in bringing down inflation, and when do they just suppress it temporarily? What is the required supporting role of fiscal and monetary policy while they are in place? These are the issues addressed in this paper.

工资-价格管制异端稳定计划货币紧缩政策信号传递