Understanding strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market
分析德州电力现货市场中企业的投标行为，构建均衡模型并用企业层面数据比较实际投标与理论基准，发现大企业接近静态利润最大化，小企业则显著偏离。
We examine the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity spot market, where bidders submit hourly supply schedules to sell power. We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding and use detailed firm‐level data on bids and marginal costs to compare actual bidding behavior to theoretical benchmarks. Firms with large stakes in the market performed close to the theoretical benchmark of static profit maximization. However, smaller firms utilized excessively steep bid schedules significantly deviating from this benchmark. Further analysis suggests that payoff scale has an important effect on firms' willingness and ability to participate in complex, strategic market environments.