Corporate Hedging and Speculative Incentives: Implications for Swap Market Default Risk
揭示了企业在风险转移与套期保值之间的权衡，指出多期环境下企业有套期保值动机，但信息不对称下无限制的互换交易会导致投机过度，引发互换和债务市场崩溃，价格手段无效，需依赖额外信息或信用增强来维持均衡。
This paper demonstrates a tradeoff between the risk-shifting and hedging incentives of firms and identifies conditions under which each dominates. A firm may have the incentive to hedge in a multi-period context, even if no such incentive exists in a single-period one. Unrestricted access to swaps in the presence of asymmetric information about firm type and the swapping motive would lead to unbounded speculation resulting in breakdowns in swap and debt markets. Price-based methods are unable to control this and market makers have to rely upon additional exposure information or credit enhancement devices to preserve equilibrium.