Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets*
通过实验比较斯塔克尔伯格和古诺双寡头市场，发现斯塔克尔伯格市场无论匹配方式如何都产出更高、效率更高；古诺市场复制了以往结果，而斯塔克尔伯格市场中的竞争强度在固定配对下减弱，但存在偏离子博弈完美均衡的现象，可归因于对不利不平等的厌恶。
We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matching and partial collusion under fixed pairs. We also find, for Stackelberg markets, that competition becomes less intense when firms remain in pairs but we find considerable deviations from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction which can be attributed to an aversion to disadvantageous inequality.