通过可交易生育权的人口政策

POPULATION POLICY THROUGH TRADABLE PROCREATION ENTITLEMENTS*

International Economic Review · 2009
被引 54
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

讨论可交易的生育配额和豁免权,分析其对贫富、教育水平和国际再分配的影响,认为生育权可有效控制人口而不必然反再分配。

Abstract

One of the first tradable rights proposal is Boulding's ( The Meaning of the Twentieth Century , London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1964 ), dealing with overpopulation. We discuss both tradable procreation allowances and exemptions domestically and globally, to address underpopulation as well. We focus on three effects. Notably, the rights' tradability entails that whereas exemptions or expensive enough allowances benefit the poor, cheap allowances benefit the rich. A natalist policy also worsens the average education level of the next generation, whereas population control enhances it. Also, if procreation rights are grandfathered to countries, the scheme redistributes further. Our analysis suggests that procreation entitlements may be efficient in controlling population, without being necessarily anti‐redistributive.

可交易生育权人口政策代际教育效应再分配效应