A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons
提出一个简单拍卖机制，通过内生数量可转让许可证的密封投标统一价格拍卖，并将部分拍卖收入返还给企业，实现任何企业数量下的最优配置，且诚实报价是占优策略。
Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). This paper proposes a simple mechanism that implements the first-best for any number of firms: a uniform price, sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. Paybacks, which rapidly decrease with the number of firms, are such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non-cooperatively or collusively. The mechanism also provides firms with incentives to invest in socially optimal R&D.