Seeking Closure: Competition in Complementary Markets*
研究一家公司在两个互补市场都参与时，选择封闭标准还是开放标准对利润、市场份额和消费者福利的影响，发现封闭标准虽降低利润但增加市场份额，且消费者反而受益。
ABSTRACT When offering a product that has a complementary product in a different market, a firm must consider the interdependence between the complementary products as well as the competition within markets. If the firm participates in both markets, the balancing act becomes even more challenging. This article provides insights about strategies in this latter setting: when should the firm seek to keep its products closed to competing complementary products, and when would the firm be better off by accepting a common standard? To address these questions, we employ standard game theoretic analysis to a simple spatial model that captures aspects of both intermarket externalities and intramarket competition. We find that if a firm participates in both markets and chooses a closed standard, it achieves lower profits compared to an open standard, but gains greater market share. Surprisingly, we find that customers are better off when standards are kept closed.