SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
通过投票与社会学习模型，比较顺序选举与同时选举的福利效果，发现顺序选举给早期州过多权重但为后期选民提供信息，同时选举则偏向领先者；对总统初选的量化分析显示同时选举略优。
Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front‐runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front‐runner advantage is small, but sequential elections are preferred if the advantage is large. Our quantitative welfare analysis of presidential primaries suggests that simultaneous systems slightly outperform sequential systems.