Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk
提出一种彩票选择理论，决策者注意力被显著收益吸引，导致真实概率被扭曲为偏向显著收益的决策权重，统一解释了风险寻求、阿莱悖论等实证现象，并给出新预测。
Abstract We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By specifying decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from prospect theory, which we test.