Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
建立了一个包含策略性政党、候选人和选民的代议制民主模型，发现比例代表制通常比多数制产生更多有效政党，但在偏好不对称时结果可能反转，且比例代表制下的政策更温和。
I introduce a model of representative democracy with strategic parties, strategic candidates, strategic voters and multiple districts. If policy preferences are similar across districts and not too concentrated within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under proportional representation (PR) than under plurality, and both electoral systems determine the median voter's preferred policy. However, for more asymmetric distributions of preferences the Duvergerian predictions can be reversed, and the policy outcome with PR is more moderate than the one with plurality. Sincere voting induces more party formation, and strategic voting can be observed more often under PR. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.