Do Side Payments Help? Collective Decisions and Strategic Delegation
研究在策略性委托的集体决策中，附带支付何时能促进合作。当各方异质性小、项目不确定性和典型价值大时，附带支付反而有害；参与方增多时，无论有无附带支付都可能陷入僵局。
I investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one party's participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less, because this increases her bargaining power. Reluctant agents, in turn, implement too few projects. I show that side payments are bad if the heterogeneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large.With a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments, but delegation becomes more strategic as well, and cooperation decreases in either case