Fairness and Contract Design
实验表明，在道德风险情境下，公平关切显著影响合同的实际与最优选择；当存在公平意识参与者时，自愿奖金合同优于显性激励合同，而预付高薪的信任合同效率较低。
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.