Estimation of an efficient tomato contract
分三阶段估计加州加工番茄行业的合同模型，发现种植者风险规避系数为0.08，高激励合同提高可溶性固形物含量但成本增加1.8%，信息约束导致效率损失1%，而质量测量提升效率1.08%。
An agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry is estimated in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare computed compensations with actual compensations and choose preference parameters to minimise distance between the two. Assuming perfect competition and risk neutrality for processors, we obtain an estimate of 0.08 for growers' measure of constant absolute risk aversion, and find that growers who face higher-powered incentives produce higher levels of soluble solids, at a cost that is 1.8 per cent greater than otherwise. Efficiency losses from information constraints are 1 per cent of mean compensation, whereas existing quality measurement improves efficiency by 1.08 per cent. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.