A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats
形式化了纳什（1953）关于均衡选择的建议，为“内生威胁下的纳什谈判”解提供了更坚实的基础，并将类似推理应用于无限期博弈，为带合同的两人重复博弈提供均衡选择。
This paper concerns the two-stage game introduced in Nash (1953). It formalizes a suggestion made (but not pursued) by Nash regarding equilibrium selection in that game, and hence offers an arguably more solid foundation for the “Nash bargaining with endogenous threats” solution. Analogous reasoning is then applied to an infinite horizon game to provide equilibrium selection in two-person repeated games with contracts. In this setting, issues about enforcement of threats are much less problematic than in Nash's static setting. The analysis can be extended to stochastic games with contracts.