Do Remittances Lead to a Public Moral Hazard in Developing Countries? An Empirical Investigation
研究了在治理不善的发展中国家，汇款流入是否会减少政府在教育和健康上的公共支出，即公共道德风险问题。基于86个发展中国家1996-2007年的数据，发现当治理较差时，汇款对公共教育和健康支出有负面影响。
Abstract This article tests the hypothesis that in a context of ‘bad governance’, remittance inflows strongly reduce public spending on education and health in receiving countries; a phenomenon called the ‘public moral hazard problem’. Using a large sample of 86 developing countries over the period 1996–2007, and after factoring in the endogeneity of remittances, the results suggest a negative impact of remittances on public spending on education and health, when governance is bad in remittance-dependent economies.