Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information
研究了当代理人类型是私人信息且随时间持续时，关系激励合同的设计，发现完全混同合同存在，但部分分离能提高产出。
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privatelyobserved agent types that are persistent over time.For a sufficiently productive relationship, a full pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationship choose the same action.When some separation is feasible, the parties can do better than with full pooling.When future actions are optimal, however, full separation of all types is not possible.There is, though, an equilibrium with separation into pools each containing a non-degenerate interval of types and fully separating individual types is not generally optimal.Separation results in an increase in output.