Indigent Care as Quid Pro Quo in Hospital Regulation
研究医院为何自愿承担大量贫困医疗负担，发现它们通过提供贫困医疗换取监管保护（如许可证审批优势），并用佛罗里达州数据验证了这一假设。
Hospitals expend considerable resources each year to provide health care to the poor. Why do some hospitals voluntarily take on a disproportionate burden of this care? Our view is that the burdened hospitals are not simply altruistic. They are indirectly compensated for this expense with legal protections against competition under certificate-ofneed (CON) regulation. We test this hypothesis in a recursive model, explaining which hospitals are likely to win CON approval. The results indicate that, controlling for the endogeneity of indigent care, regulators in Florida systematically awarded licenses to hospitals providing greater amounts of care to the poor. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology