The Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, 1746–1793
研究了法国大革命前政府债务市场的历史，发现君主制因征税困难而持续存在违约风险，违约有规律地针对特定资产，金融市场对此有反映，导致新借款成本远高于旧债收益，政府被迫依赖昂贵的人寿年金。
This article offers a new quantitative history of the market for government debt in France before the Revolution. The monarchy was a persistent default risk because of institutional obstacles to raising taxes. Default followed observable rules in targeting specific assets. The financial market reflected both facts: interest rates were high on the safest assets and ranged higher on the most likely default targets. The cost of all forms of new borrowing became substantially higher than the yields on old debt, resulting in increasing government reliance on expensive life annuities.