Private versus Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution, and Optimality
研究企业家在雇佣掌握资产回报分布信息的经理时，选择私人还是公共公司形式。发现公共股权在发行成本低或资产特有风险高且所有者足够风险厌恶或乐观时更优，并探讨了公司形式对投资政策和所有权分布的影响。
ABSTRACT Examined in this paper is the choice between private and public incorporation of an asset for an entrepreneur (asset owner) who hires a manager with superior information about the asset's return distribution. Public sale of equity is shown to be the preferred alternative when (a) capital market issue costs are low or (b) the assest's idiosyncratic risk is high and the owner is either sufficiently risk averse or sufficiently “optimistic” about the asset's expected return. Thus, those assets deemed most valuable by their owners will tend to be publicly incorporated. The paper also explores the impact of incorporation mode—private versus public—and information structure on the firm's investment policy and ownership distribution.