Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets
研究具有网络外部性的双边市场中企业的定价与网络选择，发现即使垄断或多厂商竞争下，多个非对称网络也能共存，一个网络在一侧更便宜且更大，另一侧则相反。
This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibria have the property that one network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side. Product differentiation is endogenized by consumers' network choices.