The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Financial Analysts’ Information Environment
研究了欧盟强制采用国际财务报告准则对分析师预测误差和离散度的影响，发现只有在执法严格且国内准则与IFRS差异大的国家，或企业有透明报告激励时，效果才显著。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ information environment. To control for the effect of confounding concurrent events, we use a control sample of firms that had already voluntarily adopted IFRS at least two years prior to the mandatory adoption date. We find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion decrease relative to this control sample only for those mandatory IFRS adopters domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS. Furthermore, for mandatory adopters domiciled in countries with both weak enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS, we find that forecast errors and dispersion decrease more for firms with stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. These results highlight the important roles of enforcement regimes and firm‐level reporting incentives in determining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption.