The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse
研究借款人比贷款人更了解自身风险的市场中信贷分配问题，发现信贷分配效率低下且政府干预可改善，同时无风险利率的微小变化可能引发信贷分配和市场效率的剧烈变动，为政府作为最后贷款人提供了理论依据。
This paper examines the allocation of credit in a market in which borrowers have greater information concerning their own riskiness than do lenders. It illustrates that (1) the allocation of credit is inefficient and at times can be improved by government intervention, and (2) small changes in the exogenous risk-free interest rate can cause large (discontinuous) changes in the allocation of credit and the efficiency of the market equilibrium. These conclusions suggests a role for government as the lender of last resort.