Collective Action for Local Commons Management in Rural Yunnan, China: Empirical Evidence and Hypotheses Using Evolutionary Game Theory
利用演化博弈论提出灌溉管理集体行动的假设，基于云南农村数据发现，非农就业机会少、收入差距小且资源限制适中的社区更易产生集体行动，且无政府干预的社区表现更好。
This paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management, with the help of evolutionary game theory. Data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural Yunnan, China. An econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided, the degree of income disparity is quite small, and resource restrictions are moderately problematic. The finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders. <i></i>