Exclusivity Contracts, Insurance and Financial Market Foreclosure
研究了排他性合同在风险厌恶下既能实现最优风险分担，又可能排斥更高效竞争对手和金融投资者的双重效应，并发现纯金融工具可在不扭曲产品市场的情况下实现风险分担。
We study the trade‐off between the positive effects (risk‐sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of A ghion and B olton [ ] under risk‐aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk‐sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival into the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk‐sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, risk‐sharing alone cannot be invoked to defend exclusivity contracts.