Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria
综述了多重均衡博弈的计量分析方法，说明多重性不必然阻碍模型估计，反而可能改善识别，但忽视它会导致设定错误。分别讨论了完全信息和不完全信息博弈，以及社会互动模型，适合从事结构估计的学者快速了解该领域进展。
This article reviews the recent literature on the econometric analysis of games in which multiple solutions are possible. Multiplicity does not necessarily preclude the estimation of a particular model (and, in certain cases, even improves its identification), but ignoring it can lead to misspecifications. The review starts with a general characterization of structural models that highlights how multiplicity affects the classical paradigm. Because the information structure is an important guide to identification and estimation strategies, I discuss games of complete and incomplete information separately. Although many of the techniques discussed here can be transported across different information environments, some are specific to particular models. Models of social interactions are also surveyed. I close with a brief discussion of postestimation issues and research prospects.