Suspense: Dynamic Incentives in Sports Contests
构建动态体育竞赛模型，发现若观众只关心选手努力程度，线性差分激励优于排名激励；若观众在意悬念（比赛越胶着越看重努力），则排名激励可能更优，且悬念需求足够高时最优排名激励优于一大类激励方案。
In a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants'efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of incentive schemes. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © 2009 by the Royal Economic Society.