Corporate mergers, stockholder diversification, and changes in systematic risk
研究了并购中企业相关性与系统性风险的关系，通过控制目标公司风险、纠正异方差问题并考虑杠杆影响，发现相关与不相关并购中公司分散化与股东分散化的绩效差异。
Abstract Strategic management literature suggests a relationship between systematic risk and the relatedness of merging firms. This is tested for a sample of 120 large mergers by controlling for the systematic risk of the target firm, correcting for possible problems of heteroskedasticity, and estimating shifts in risk over daily as well as monthly time horizons. Finally, the influence of leverage is considered. The findings highlight a performance distinction between corporate diversification and stockholder diversification in instances of related and unrelated mergers.