Welfare Dependence and Self-Control: An Empirical Analysis
估计了一个包含异质性时间偏好的劳动供给与福利参与的双曲贴现模型，发现多数人存在时间不一致性，且福利制度可能加剧承诺问题。
A hyperbolic discounting model of labour supply and welfare participation with heterogeneous time preference parameters is estimated. Exclusion restrictions are constructed from variations in behaviour induced by time limits in a welfare reform experiment. We find that most individuals are time-inconsistent, and they exhibit varying degrees of present bias and perception of the commitment problem. Introducing a welfare component to the tax system can make individuals worse off by aggravating the commitment problem. Certain dynamic policy interventions carry sizeable commitment-related work incentives; for instance, a dynamic sanction triggered by past employment can be preferred by some individuals as a commitment device.