The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
用子博弈完美均衡和纳什谈判解研究企业成本函数与合谋行为的关系，发现最优合谋价格高于低成本企业的垄断价格，且随成本差异变化。
Applying a selection criterion that uses both subgame perfection and the Nash bargaining solution, this paper investigates the relationship between firms' cost functions and collusive behavior. It is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price that the low-cost firm would set if it was a monopolist. Comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low-cost-firm's unit cost, but is decreasing in the high-cost-firm's unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.