The Design of Bankruptcy Law: A Case for Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations
在不完全契约环境下推导最优破产法，通过限制谈判或拍卖机制防止策略性破产、促进信息真实披露，并引入管理层偏见以提供正确的事前决策激励。
In an incomplete contracting environment, bankruptcy is considered to be a renegotiation of the firm's financial contracts. An optimal bankruptcy law is derived as optimal restric? tions on the environment within which the claimants to a distressed firm bargain. The law is used as a commitment device to ensure actions that are ex ante optimal but not subgame perfect. We show that the bankruptcy court can use two types of mechanisms to implement the optimal bankruptcy outcome: direct restrictions on the bargaining game between the claimants, and the use of a restricted auction. In both cases, the restrictions prevent the strategic use of bankruptcy by firms not in financial distress, provide for truthful revelation of information so that distress results in an ex post efficient allocation of resources, and es? tablish a bias toward the manager in reorganizations that provides correct ex ante decision making incentives.