Other People’s Taxes: Nonresident Voters and Statewide Limitation of Local Government
研究了为何选民会支持全州性税收限制来改变本地政府，提出非居民选民通过投票影响其他社区税率的假说，并以马萨诸塞州1980年通过的2½号提案为例进行实证检验。
Why would voters resort to a statewide tax limitation to force change in their own local government? This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that property tax limitations succeeded because they allowed voters to lower tax rates in other communities. Statewide limitations effectively extend the voting franchise to individuals who have no standing in local elections. Voters may have preferences for tax and expenditure levels in other jurisdictions because they receive rents from employment in those jurisdictions, because they directly own taxable assets in those jurisdictions, or because changes in other jurisdictions might influence their own residential location choice. Empirical tests of this hypothesis focus on the Massachusetts experience with Proposition 2$$\frac{1}{2}$$, which passed in 1980. Voting patterns, household mobility patterns, and postproposition growth in property values all support the nonresident hypothesis.