公私合作伙伴关系的基本公共财政

THE BASIC PUBLIC FINANCE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Journal of the European Economic Association · 2007
被引 63
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

分析公私合作伙伴关系(PPP)的公共财政基础,指出PPP不能因节省公共资金而合理化,并刻画了最优合同的特征,包括最低收入保障和收入上限,同时发现实际合同与最优合同存在根本差异。

Abstract

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.

公私合作伙伴关系最优合同收入担保风险分配