The physician–patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission
用博弈论中的廉价谈话理论和信息经济学中的信任品理论，重新审视了供给诱导需求假说，发现该假说仅在特定治疗决策中成立，并证明存在一个纳什均衡使患者能约束医生的诱导行为，同时市场不会崩溃。
We show that the intuition underlying the supplier-induced demand (SID) hypothesis is reflected in the cheap-talk literature from game theory, and in the credence-good literature from the economics of information. Applying these theories, we conclude that a neoclassical version of the SID hypothesis is only relevant for treatment decisions involving an expensive treatment that is equally effective in curing several states, but efficient in curing only some of these states (in that a cheaper treatment is efficient otherwise). For a simple game involving such a treatment decision, we show that a Nash equilibrium exists where the patient is able to constrain the physician in inducing demand, without the market for the potentially induced treatment failing. This equilibrium allows us to derive comparative statistics and welfare results.